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Review essay 
Cyber War and Lessons from History in the Digital Age 
R. Gerald Hughes and Ryan Shaffer 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Understanding Cyber Conflict: Fourteen Analogies, edited by George Perkovich and Ariel E. 
Levite, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2017, xii+298 pp. $34.95 (paperback), 
ISBN: 9781626164987. 
 
‘[C]ybersecurity is one of the greatest challenges we face as a nation.’ President Barack 
Obama, The White House, Washington DC, 2 December 2016.1 
 
‘We must take into account the plans and directions of development of the armed forces of 
other countries … Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority, they will be 
asymmetric, and less expensive.’ President Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation, 11 May 2006.2 
 
Much used, although often little understood, the terms ‘cyber warfare’ and ‘cyber conflict’ litter 
the Internet and the print media in the guise of a variety of revelatory exposes, confessions, 
exclusives and alarmist headlines. In short, cyber conflict entails activities – at either the state or 
sub-state level – whereby attempts to damage an adversary through attacking computers, 
information networks or any other facet of the modern Information Technology (IT) society. 
Understanding Cyber Conflict represents an attempt to assess current debates and past and future 
developments. This anthology, edited by George Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite, examines how 
governments are struggling with the unprecedented role of cyber issues as countries face threats 
with thievery, subversion, terrorism, covert operations and warfare. With fourteen chapters by 
government officials and scholars from Israel, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, the book presents historical analogies to provide insight into the capabilities, risks and 
preventative abilities of cyber technology. George Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite’s ‘Introduction’ 
explains how vital it is to understand the benefits and pitfalls of cyber technology by discussing 
historical cases of new technology shaping weaponry, war and preventing conflict. They argue, 
‘To realize its benefits, and to minimize the technology’s destructive potential, the widest 
possible range of societies and states must learn to steward it wisely’ (p. 13). Through historical 
analysis of earlier technologies, the authors shed light on military-technological issues 
surrounding the use of cyber weapons, how effective they could be in a war and preventing cyber 
conflict. 
 
Human beings think, learn, and communicate through analogies. We use 
analogies – naturally, often without trying– to familiarize that which is new. As 
Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May recorded in their classic study, 
Thinking in Time,3 policymakers and pundits regularly invoke analogies as they 
struggle to make sense of and affect new situations, often without adequate 
reflection. This practice occurs now regarding the cyber world, which is 
evolving with an ever-quickening pace (p. 1). 
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Understanding Cyber Conflict is divided in three sections with the first exploring cyber weapons, 
including capabilities for intelligence and striking purposes, which the authors compare with 
earlier technologies.4 Michael Warner explores intelligence and counter-intelligence in 
cyberspace by detailing how computers are an extension of what humans have done for 
intelligence throughout history, but he argues with cyber operations the scale of exploitable 
targets is unprecedented with policy questions that did not exist with earlier technologies, like 
radio or telegraph. In ‘Nonlethal Weapons and Cyber Capabilities’, Robert E. Schmidle Jr., 
Michael Sulmeyer and Ben Buchanan look at  nonlethal weapons and cyber capabilities which, 
they assert, ‘may be useful to analogize’ in ‘four areas: their ability to incapacitate, the reduced 
collateral damage they inflict, the reversibility of their effects, and their ability to deter’ (p. 31). 
They conclude their chapter by asserting that  
 
despite very real concerns about a coming conflict in cyberspace, some of the 
most promising features of cyber capabilities are also common with other 
nonlethal weapons: their effects need not be permanent and could possibly be 
so narrowly tailored that collateral damage is all but eliminated. As with any 
other instrument of military power, cyber capabilities should be used only as a 
last resort. But when military coercion is required to secure US interests, cyber 
capabilities–like nonlethal weapons–may offer US military commanders the 
opportunity to do so in ways that greatly reduce the incidence of death and 
destruction on all sides of a future conflict (p. 41). 
 
Next in Understanding Cyber Conflict, ‘Cyber Weapons and Precision-Guided Munitions’ by  
James M. Acton compares cyber weapons and precision-guided munitions, such as cruise 
missiles, with attention to reducing collateral damage and decreasing distance from targets, 
which changed national decision-making about force and provokes questions about cyber 
weapons’ limitations for achieving strategic political-military objectives. Likewise, in ‘Cyber, 
Drones, and Secrecy’, David E. Sanger discusses commonalities between armed drones and 
cyber weapons through an analysis about advantages and ‘secret’ decision-making, finding  that 
government ‘fear of revealing the size and scope of’ American cyber capabilities ‘has frozen 
many of the most important’ public ‘discussions’ (p. 76). Regardless, Sanger notes that the utility 
of such means continues to raise important issues for policymakers. 
 
Today as President Trump has taken over…mature drone and cyber programs, 
clearly the two weapons raise similar moral and legal issues that future 
presidents will have to grapple with. Indeed, Pentagon officials openly wonder 
whether the next major global conflict might open in cyberspace and be 
prosecuted by a range of new, autonomous weapons–not only aerial unmanned 
vehicles but also undersea ones. And yet these drone and cyber weapons, 
nurtured by the same policymakers and sometimes used in the same conflicts, 
have taken very different paths–as have the questions surrounding their use… 
In short, the decisions President Donald Trump will have to make will likely be 
similar to the vexing choices Mr. Obama faced on whether to use cyber 
weapons as an alternative to more traditional forms of low-level warfare, even 
while recognizing that, sooner or later, that may escalate the global use of 
3 
 
cyber weapons. Only at the end of the Obama administration was it possible to 
start comparing the issues, and lessons, raised by using drones and cyber 
weapons (pp. 63, 64). 
 
The second section of Understanding Cyber Conflict centers on differing conceptions of cyber 
war through historical comparisons about transformations in modern warfare.5 Here, the Russian 
case is instructive. In 2004, Vladimir Kvachkov, a former GRU officer, stated that: ‘A new type 
of war has emerged, in which armed warfare has given up its decisive place in the achievement 
of the military and political objectives of war to another kind of warfare - information warfare.’6 
In his chapter ‘Cyber War and Information War à la Russe’, Stephen Blank looks at recent 
Russian offensive cyber operations and information warfare against its neighbors Estonia, 
Georgia and Ukraine, and argues it is a continuation of Soviet Union strategy to create 
insecurity. Moscow’s post-2014 interventions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine were modeled on 
the actions against Estonia and Georgia (in 2007 and 2008 respectively).  
 
The greater duration and intensity of the Ukraine conflict reflects the deeper 
political-economic connections between Russia and Ukraine and the greater 
stakes Russia perceives in repelling Western influence over Ukraine’s future. 
Russian leaders perceived the onset of the crisis–that is, the demonstrations 
against Viktor Yanukovych’s government–and the subsequent departure of 
Yanukovych as a coup conducted with, at least, the collusion of the West.7 As 
such, the situation provided stark confirmation of the Kremlin’s portrayal of 
existential US-led hostility to Russian interests. As in Estonia, Russian actors 
mounted intense IO to shape how Ukrainians, Russians, and international 
audiences perceived the unfolding events. These operations were conducted 
through all media, especially Web-based outlets. Opinion surveys and 
anecdotal reporting in Russia indicate the effectiveness of these efforts in 
shaping perceptions in Russia (if not elsewhere) (p. 91). 
 
If the subsequent Russian cyber attack on Ukraine was actually instigated (directly or indirectly) 
by Moscow then this suggests a continuation of the kind of strategic logic that was previously 
seen in the case of Georgia. 
 
[In Georgia] where capabilities to attack the energy infrastructure were put in 
place but not activated. In Georgia the Georgian state did not escalate the 
conflict, and Western powers did not intervene. Russian cyber operators did not 
then have cause to attack Georgia’s energy supply system. Conversely, the 
attack on the energy supply to Russian-held Crimea was, in Russian eyes, an 
escalation that invited a somewhat symmetrical response. Ukraine’s energy 
supply was cut off–the symmetrical part–but the method was a sophisticated 
cyber penetration and attack when compared to the simple toppling of 
transmission towers. Taken together, the Georgian and Ukrainian examples 
reflect [the] logic of deterrence and compellence by cyber means. A capability 
to do harm is emplaced to deter adversaries from acting against Russian 
interests. When the adversary is restrained, the cyber attack is not unleashed, 
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but when the adversary attacks Russian interests, Russian actors inflict a 
roughly proportionate response (p. 92). 
 
Meanwhile, the Russian government, naturally, denies accusations of engaging in cyber warfare 
against other states as a matter of course. (The Soviet Union did much the same with regard to its 
‘dirty tricks’ before its dissolution in 1991). That said, an analysis by the US Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) in January 2017 did identify key elements of Moscow’s ‘Information 
Confrontation’ (informatsionnoye protivoborstvo (IPb)/ информационное противоборство).8  
 
Russia views the information sphere as a key domain for modern military 
conflict. Moscow perceives the information domain as strategically decisive 
and critically important to control its domestic populace and influence 
adversary states. Information warfare is a key means of achieving its ambitions 
of becoming a dominant player on the world stage. 
 
Since at least 2010, the Russian military has prioritized the development of 
forces and means for what it terms “information confrontation,” which is a 
holistic concept for ensuring information superiority, during peacetime and 
wartime. This concept includes control of the information content as well as the 
technical means for disseminating that content. Cyber operations are part of 
Russia’s attempts to control the information environment.9 
 
The national security apparatus in Moscow divides its ‘Information Confrontation’ (IPb) 
techniques into two categories: a) ‘Informational-Technical’; and b) ‘Informational-
Psychological’. The former ‘is roughly analogous to computer network operations, including 
computer-network defense, attack, and exploitation.’ The latter term relates to ‘attempts to 
change people’s behavior or beliefs in favor of Russian governmental objectives.’10 In 2011, the 
Russian government directed its cyberwar capabilities towards the Arab Spring and the emerging 
civil war in Syria.11 In 2017, the US DIA report concluded that President Vladimir Putin had 
personally directed a Russian campaign, with cyber attacks and the dissemination of false 
information very much to the fore, so as to assist Donald Trump in the presidential campaign 
against Hilary Rodham Clinton in 2016. Putin repeatedly denied accusations of interference but 
conceded that ‘patriotically minded’ Russian hackers may have done so. (This, of course, echoes 
Moscow’s claim that any Russian citizens fighting in eastern Ukraine are ‘volunteers’. Even 
said, Putin’s statement was a shift from outright denial and he asserted that hackers ‘are like 
artists’, essentially free spirits whose inclinations and motives shift with time, opportunity and 
mood. ‘If they are patriotically minded, they start making their contributions–which are right, 
from their point of view–to fight against those who say bad things about Russia’ but ‘we’re not 
doing this on the state level’.12 
 
Next, in ‘An Ounce of (Virtual) Prevention?’, John Arquilla delves deeper into the historical 
record, analyzing preventative force from the Napoleonic Wars until the Second World War and 
compares it to using cyber capabilities to slow Iran’s uranium enrichment abilities, but argues 
such preventive actions provoke ‘defensive measures’ and ‘a persistent fear of preventive attack 
may spark very aggressive action’ (pp. 107-8). In contrast, Francis J. Gavin examines how 
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railroad technology was an ‘element’ of the crisis that led to First World War with the 
ambiguities of military mobilization for offensive and defensive purposes, and finds similarities 
and differences in how cyber shortened space and time for leaders to make decisions. During 
foreign policy crises, Gavin notes that the most popular historical analogy invoked amongst US 
policymakers and commentators is Appeasement and the Munich Agreement.13 He asserts that 
scholars of international relations, by contrast, are more likely to refer to July crisis of 1914 (p. 
111). Also studying the First World War, Nicholas A. Lambert reviews the significance of 
Britain using its global reach with telegraph and undersea cables in economic warfare and how it 
has parallels with a cyber-attack, but ‘the British experience’ shows ‘that the infrastructure of a 
globalized economic system makes for a weapon of mass destruction rather than a precision 
strike weapon’ (p. 143). Whereas with Pearl Harbor, Emily O. Goldman and Michael Warner 
explain how it was more of an American intelligence analysis failure about Japan rather than a 
‘surprise,’ and they conclude that countries like the United States with militaries and economies 
that depend on the Internet must work harder at ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ prevention and responses. 
 
In the third and final section of Understanding Cyber Conflict, the authors discuss preventing 
and managing cyber conflict through historical experiences that involved evolving technology 
playing important roles in war.14 Steven E. Miller compares nuclear technology with cyber 
technology by highlighting trajectories of dual-use technologies and finds cyber is ‘very 
different’ in ‘a number of fundamental respects,’ including deterrence, arms control and 
nonproliferation that does not transfer well to the cyber framework (p. 161). In another chapter 
that discusses Pearl Harbor (itself the subject of many historical analogies),15 John Arquilla 
analyzes how Americans failed to learn lessons shortly after Pearl Harbor about defending from 
sea attacks and compares the situation to an ‘inadequate’ government and private industry 
response to protecting computers, networks and data. Turning to ethical and legal concerns, 
Dorothy E. Denning and Bradley J. Strawser apply air defense principles to historical cyberspace 
examples showing ‘that, when properly understood and executed, is neither offensive nor 
necessarily harmful and dangerous’ (p. 207). Whereas, Peter Feaver and Kenneth Geers draw 
from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s pre-delegation policy of allowing military commanders 
to use nuclear weapons in specific situations, which is compared to changes in how quickly 
leaders must ‘manage’ transformations brought by cyberspace. Lastly, Florian Egloff describes 
reducing cyber threats with an assessment of historical lessons from naval privateering when 
governments hired private actors for countering attacks, and argues the analogy ‘allows for a rich 
understanding of the forces giving rise to the multiplicity of actors shaping the institution of 
privateering and eventually leading to its abolishment’ (p. 242). 
 
Understanding Cyber Conflict makes a solid contribution to an important, but sometimes 
neglected part of national security by offering possibilities and versatilities of cyber capabilities 
and conflict through analogies. George Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite’s conclusion explores the 
challenges that countries and the international community faces with cyber conflict, writing 
‘there is a tension between one’s potential interest in using cyber operations to exercise control 
over one’s population or to weaken or otherwise harm adversaries, and one’s interest in 
preserving the functionality of the global cyber system’ (p. 268). In addition to summarizing 
characteristics of cyber weapons and differences with military technologies, they also broadly 
describe private and government policies and activities that could prevent and manage cyber 
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conflict as well as issues that moderate offensive cyber activities that effect countries in different 
ways. With chapters written by authors ranging from National Security Agency and US Cyber 
Command officials to journalists and scholars, the historical examples and analyses shed light on 
both the unpredictable impact fast-paced and evolving technology has on conflict and what 
lessons can be learned from technology’s role in war. Some historians will be critical of the 
methodology that uses historical examples to understand contemporary situations with differing  
technologies, often radically so, although the editors do note that the differences in the 
comparisons ‘are as important to understand as [are the] similarities’ (p. 2). For instance, 
scholars of British history will quibble with some of the generalisations about the British Empire 
during the First World War as the causes of war and consequences of war have multitude of 
factors that were not fully addressed in any of the chapters. In any case, the notion that statesmen 
learn from history is almost always dismissed as a chimera by historians. When refuting this 
Hegel is nearly always invoked (‘Rulers, Statesmen, Nations, are wont to be emphatically 
commended to the teaching which experience offers in history. But what experience and history 
teach is this – that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted 
on principles deduced from it.’).16 Yet, on balance, government officials and academics 
interested in the potential use, effectiveness and management of cyber conflict will nevertheless 
find this anthology a useful addition to the emerging and rapidly expanding literature. 
 
References 
 
• William Booth, ‘Ukraine's parliament votes to oust president; former prime minister is 
freed from prison’, Washington Post, 22 February 2014. 
• Defence Intelligence Agency, Russian Military Power: Building a Military to Support 
Great Power Aspirations (Washington DC: Defence Intelligence Agency, 2017).  
• Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare (Rome: NATO Defense College - 
NDC Fellowship Monograph Series, 2016). 
• Georg W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover 1956). 
• R. Gerald Hughes, ‘“The Best and the Brightest”: The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy 
administration, and the lessons of history’ in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds), The 
Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2016) 117-
141. 
• R. Gerald Hughes, The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 
1945 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
• R. Gerald Hughes, ‘The Ghosts of Appeasement: Britain and the legacy of the Munich 
Agreement’, Journal of Contemporary History, 48/4 (2013) 688-716. 
• Clark Mindock (New York), ‘Vladimir Putin hints ‘patriotic’ private Russian hackers 
could have meddled in 2016 US election’, The Independent (London), 1 June 2017. 
• Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 
Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986). 
• President Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on the Report of the Commission 
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity’, The White House, Washington DC, 2 December 
2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/02/statement-
president-report-commission-enhancing-national-cybersecurity (accessed 30 June 
2018). 
7 
 
• Dominic Tierney, ‘“Pearl Harbor in Reverse”: Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9/3 (2007) 49-77. 
 
R. Gerald Hughes 
Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies  
Aberystwyth University 
E-mail: rbh@aber.ac.uk 
 
Ryan Shaffer  
Independent scholar  
E-mail: ShafferRyan9@gmail.com 
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6766-2194 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 President Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on the Report of the Commission on Enhancing National 
Cybersecurity’, The White House, Washington DC, 2 December 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2016/12/02/statement-president-report-commission-enhancing-national-cybersecurity (accessed 30 
March 2018).  
2 Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare (Rome: NATO Defense College - NDC Fellowship 
Monograph Series, 2016) 3. 
3 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: 
Freedom Press, 1986). 
4 Section I. ‘What Are Cyber Weapons Like?’; Chapter 1. Michael Warner, ‘Intelligence in Cyber - and Cyber in 
Intelligence’, 17-29; Chapter 2. Lt. Gen. Robert E. Schmidle Jr. (USMC, Ret.), Michael Sulmeyer, and Ben 
Buchanan, ‘Nonlethal Weapons and Cyber Capabilities’, 31-44; Chapter 3. James M. Acton, ‘Cyber Weapons and 
Precision-Guided Munitions’, 45-60; Chapter 4. David E. Sanger, ‘Cyber, Drones, and Secrecy’, 61-78. 
5 Section II. ‘What Might Cyber Wars Be Like?’; Chapter 5. Stephen Blank, ‘Cyber War and Information War à la 
Russe’, 81-98; Chapter 6. John Arquilla, ‘An Ounce of (Virtual) Prevention?’, 99-110; Chapter 7. Francis J. Gavin, 
‘Crisis Instability and Preemption: The 1914 Railroad Analogy’, 111-122; Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘Brits-Krieg: The 
Strategy of Economic Warfare’, 123-146; Emily O. Goldman and Michael Warner, ‘Why a Digital Pearl Harbor 
Makes Sense…and Is Possible’, 147-157. 
6 Kvachkov was an ex-GRU officer who developed a ‘theory of special operations’, which included information 
warfare. Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, 3. 
7 In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine. Strongly pro-Russian, Yanukovych was 
ousted four years later as a result of the ‘Ukrainian Revolution’. William Booth, ‘Ukraine’s parliament votes to oust 
president; former prime minister is freed from prison’, Washington Post, 22 February 2014. Yanukovych is 
currently living in exile in Russia. 
8 Trans. ‘Information Confrontation’. For the Russian state ‘information confrontation’ and ‘information war’ are 
broad and inclusive concepts. One author notes that the ‘distinction between информационное противоборство, 
(informatsionnoye protivoborstvo), information confrontation, and информационная война (informatsionnaya 
voyna), information war, is the subject of detailed debate in official Russian sources’, although the distinctions are, 
in reality, superficial. Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, 6(n.) 
9 Defence Intelligence Agency, Russian Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations 
(Washington DC: Defence Intelligence Agency, 2017) 37-38. 
10 Defence Intelligence Agency, Russian Military Power, 38. 
11 Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, 41-4. 
12 Clark Mindock (New York), ‘Vladimir Putin hints ‘patriotic’ private Russian hackers could have meddled in 2016 
US election’, The Independent (London), 1 June 2017. 
13 For relevant recent studies on this, see R. Gerald Hughes, ‘“The Best and the Brightest”: The Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the Kennedy administration, and the lessons of history’ in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds), The Cuban 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2016) 117-14; R. Gerald Hughes, The Postwar 
Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014); and R. Gerald Hughes, 
The Ghosts of Appeasement: Britain and the legacy of the Munich Agreement’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
48/4 (2013) 688-716. 
14 Section III. ‘What Are Preventing and Managing Cyber Conflict Like?’; Chapter 10. Steven E. Miller, ‘Cyber 
Threats, Nuclear Analogies? Divergent Trajectories in Adapting to New Dual-Use Technologies’, 161-179; 11. John 
Arquilla, ‘From Pearl Harbor to the “Harbor Lights”’, 181-192; 12. Dorothy E. Denning and Bradley J. Strawser, 
‘Active Cyber Defense: Applying Air Defense to the Cyber Domain’, 193-209; 13. Peter Feaver and Kenneth Geers, 
‘“When the Urgency of Time and Circumstances Clearly Does Not Permit . . .”: Pre-delegation in Nuclear and 
Cyber Scenarios’, 211-230. 14. Florian Egloff, ‘Cybersecurity and the Age of Privateering’, 231-247. 
15 On this see, for example, Dominic Tierney, ‘“Pearl Harbor in Reverse”: Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9/3 (2007) 49-77. 
16 Georg W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover 1956) 6.   
